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 Experimental literature has documented a ‘house money effect’, in which subjects 
using unearned endowments are less risk averse and more willing to consume than when 
they use an endowment they have not earned. I use Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) data to test for this effect outside the laboratory by estimating the impact of 
inherited money on charitable giving. When I control for differences between individuals, 
I find that the impact of inheritances is significantly reduced. My results indicate that the 
correlation observed in previous econometric analyses is largely driven by non-random 
allocation of inheritances to individuals predisposed to give more than average. 
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Are people more generous with unearned money than earned money? Although 
Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis argued that “transitory” income has little 
effect on consumption patterns, the economics literature currently holds that individuals 
are less risk averse and have a greater marginal propensity to consume out of money they 
did not earn. (Arkes et al., 1994; Keeler et al., 1985; Thaler and Johnson, 1990). In the 
context of generosity, this may mean that individuals would be more generous with 
unearned money than with earned money. 
Much of the literature on this topic relies on the use of laboratory experiments. 
Evidence for increased altruism has been found in both dictator games (Hoffman et al., 
1994; Ruffle et al., 1998; Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; 
Ogawa et al., 2012; Barr et al, 2015) and in public good games (Muehlbacher et al., 2009). 
However, there are counter examples. Clark (1998, 2002) and Cherry et al. (2005) failed 
to find a significant effect in public goods games. Spraggon and Oxoby (2009) even 
illustrate a “reverse ‘found money’ effect”, in which subjects with earned endowments, 
when paired with another subject with an unearned endowment, show a greater degree of 
cooperation. In simple charitable donations games, Carlsson et al. (2009) confirms a house 
money effect in both laboratory and field experiments, and Reinstein and Reiner (2012) 
find that earned endowments reduce the probability of a positive donation.  
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The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) offers an avenue to test empirically 
for this house money effect outside the laboratory. The PSID is a panel data set containing 
data on several thousand households in the United States over roughly fifty years. 
Beginning in 2001, each wave of the PSID contains data on philanthropic behavior, 
including donations to various categories of charitable organizations and volunteer work. 
Combining this information with PSID data on income, wealth, demographics, and 
inheritances, I can identify the impact of an inheritance on charitable donations. If a house 
money effect exists, people receiving inheritances should have a greater marginal 
propensity to consume out of this unearned money, and this consumption should be 
apparent in subsequent donations to charity. 
In closely related work, Steinberg et al. (2002) uses the 2001 cross section of the 
PSID to test the marginal propensity to consume (in this context, to donate to charity) out 
of different sources of income. They find a significant correlation between inherited wealth 
and charitable giving, supporting the house money effect described above. 
Because collection of data on charitable donations had only just begun, the authors 
could only use a cross sectional approach, ignoring any potential for systematic differences 
between individuals. It is possible that the results observed are biased due to a correlation 
between the likelihood of receiving an inheritance and some preexisting factor.  
This paper contributes to the literature by conducting a panel analysis, allowing me 
to adjust for heterogeneity between individuals. If individual differences are in fact driving 
the result seen in previous literature, my paper will control for these and provide a more 
accurate estimate of the true impact of inheritances on charitable giving.
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CHAPTER 2
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data is from the 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves of the PSID. The PSID randomly 
samples from two populations: one is nationally representative while the other oversamples 
low income individuals. I restrict my analysis to the nationally representative sample, 
eliminating the low income sample. I also remove households whose head changed during 
the panel, as the impact of the head on family decisions is so significant that it could be 
argued such a change results in an entirely new family. Including such households would 
confound my attempts to identify individual effects across years. The resulting data set is 
described below. Table 2.1 includes all observations, Table 2.2 describes only individuals 
who receive an inheritance at some point during the panel, and Table 2.3 describes only 
individuals who did not receive an inheritance during the panel. 
As with Steinberg et al. (2002), I estimate the impact of inheritances on charitable 
giving. Thus, I regress charitable giving on inheritances and a variety of control variables. 
To facilitate comparisons with their results, my regressions largely employ the same 
controls and specifications as theirs. First, unless otherwise noted, regressions are 
estimated in double log form, which is used in most situations involving charitable giving. 
Although Steinberg, et al. (2002) annuitizes all stocks for comparison with flows, the fixed 
effects setup of my analysis makes this procedure less necessary. Nonetheless, I report 
results with annuitization for direct comparison in the appendix. Finally, I include controls 
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for age, age squared, marital status, number of children, working status, location, and health 
of both the head and wife.  
My main analysis consists of two sets of regressions. In each regression I estimate 
the impact of inheritance on 1) total giving, 2) religious giving only, and 3) secular giving 
only. The first test is a simple double log regression as described above. For the second test 
I generate binary variables for whether an individual received an inheritance or not, 
disregarding the size of the inheritance.  
I also perform two additional tests: a linear probability model and a fixed effects 
logit model. The results differ in no significant way from the primary regressions already 
described, making them useful primarily as robustness checks. The results of these models 
are available in the appendix. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics (All Observations) 
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Give at all? 22,488 0.6979 1 0.4592 0 1 
Give to religious? 22,488 0.4654 0 0.4988 0 1 
Give to secular? 22,488 0.5975 1 0.4904 0 1 
Total giving 22,488 1,587 400 5,010 0 491,500 
Giving to religious 22,488 960 0 2,838 0 110,000 
Giving to secular 22,488 627 100 3,824 0 490,000 
Earned income 22,488 61,984 45,000 105,492 -971,999 5,500,000 
Transfers 22,488 8,382 50 20,154 0 1,039,920 
Received 
inheritance? 
22,488 0.0498 0 0.2175 0 1 
Inheritances 22,488 2,493,867 0 53,300,000 0 2,000,000,000 
Wealth 22,488 336,354 90,000 1,538,412 -2,699,990 101,000,000 
Age of head 22,488 48 47 17 18 104 
Sex of head 22,488 0 0 0 0 1 
Number of children 22,488 1 0 1 0 9 
Married? 22,488 1.8080 1 1 1 5 
Live in the South? 22,488 0.3368 0 0.4726 0 1 
Live in urban area? 22,487 0.3574 0 0.4792 0 1 
Is head working? 22,483 0.7563 1 1.5304 0 99 
Is head retired? 22,483 0.1844 0 1.5193 0 99 
is head disabled? 22,483 0.0556 0 1.4867 0 99 
Health of head 22,460 2 2 1 1 9 
Health of wife 22,452 2 2 1 0 9 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (Only Receivers) 
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Give at all? 3,807 0.8222 1 0.3824 0 1 
Give to religious? 3,807 0.5461 1 0.4979 0 1 
Give to secular? 3,807 0.7339 1 0.4420 0 1 
Total giving 3,807 2,247 725 4,871 0 110,000 
Giving to religious 3,807 1,307 100 3,820 0 110,000 
Giving to secular 3,807 940 270 2,358 0 36,625 
Earned income 3,807 73,380 60,460 73,010 -74,000 768,000 
Transfers 3,807 9,315 0 18,427 0 245,000 
Received 
inheritance? 
3,807 0.2939 0 0.4556 0 1 
Inheritances 3,807 14,700,000 0 129,000,000 0 2,000,000,000 
Wealth 3,807 514,255 206,000 1,886,648 -366,000 101,000,000 
Age of head 3,807 50 50 14 19 104 
Sex of head 3,807 0 0 0 0 1 
Number of children 3,807 1 0 1 0 7 
Married? 3,807 1.5663 1 1 1 5 
Live in the South? 3,807 0.2916 0 0.4545 0 1 
Live in urban area? 3,807 0.4379 0 0.4962 0 1 
Is head working? 3,807 0.8164 1 1.6429 0 99 
Is head retired? 3,807 0.1673 0 1.6397 0 99 
is head disabled? 3,807 0.0439 0 1.6097 0 99 
Health of head 3,803 2 2 1 1 5 




Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics (Only Non-Receivers) 
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Give at all? 18,681 0.6726 1 0.4693 0 1 
Give to religious? 18,681 0.4490 0 0.4974 0 1 
Give to secular? 18,681 0.5697 1 0.4951 0 1 
Total giving 18,681 1,453 301 5,027 0 491,500 
Giving to religious 18,681 889 0 2,588 0 85,000 
Giving to secular 18,681 564 70 4,056 0 490,000 
Earned income 18,681 59,662 42,000 110,809 -971,999 5,500,000 
Transfers 18,681 8,192 200 20,483 0 1,039,920 
Received 
inheritance? 
18,681 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0 
Inheritances 18,681 0 0 0 0 0 
Wealth 18,681 300,099 72,500 1,454,667 -2,699,990 100,000,000 
Age of head 18,681 48 46 17 18 101 
Sex of head 18,681 0 0 0 0 1 
Number of children 18,681 1 0 1 0 9 
Married? 18,681 1.8572 1 1 1 5 
Live in the South? 18,681 0.3460 0 0.4757 0 1 
Live in urban area? 18,680 0.3410 0 0.4741 0 1 
Is head working? 18,676 0.7441 1 1.5062 0 99 
Is head retired? 18,676 0.1879 0 1.4935 0 99 
is head disabled? 18,676 0.0580 0 1.4604 0 99 
Health of head 18,657 2 2 1 1 9 
Health of wife 18,649 1 1 1 0 9 
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the results of my primary regressions. The first set 
of regressions estimates the impact of inheritances on the amount of charitable giving, 
while the second instead estimates the impact of receiving an inheritance regardless of the 
size. I find that inheritances do have a significant impact on religious giving, but not on 
secular or total giving. However, this effect is much less pronounced than in prior cross 
sectional analyses. As illustrated by comparison with appendix Table A.5, the estimated 
coefficients are far more significant in cross sectional analyses. More importantly, simple 
hypothesis tests show that inherited money is no different than earned income, transfers, 
or wealth in five of the six regressions, and inherited money is never different than earned 
money. This supports my hypothesis that the previously observed results are driven mostly 
by differences between individuals, as the relationship is weakened when fixed effects are 
added. 
One possible explanation for this lack of correlation is that giving may not be as 
chronologically tied to inheriting as this model requires. If inheriting and the resultant 
giving are often separated into different two year time periods, then this regression will 
underestimate the relationship between the two. To address this concern, I specify another 
model (Table 3.3) including a one period lag of inheritances. The estimated coefficient on 
this lag will capture the impact of last period’ inheritances on giving in this period, thus 
accounting for the actions of indecisive individuals who take their time deciding how to 
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spend their inheritances. As Table 3.3 shows, however, neither inheritances in the current 
period nor inheritances in the previous period are significant, so it is clear that donation 
timing is not responsible for the weak correlation observed in the base model. 
Another theory is that different wealth categories might treat inheritances 
differently, and the average of otherwise significant effects within each category yields an 
insignificant aggregate result. It makes sense that households in the bottom quartiles would 
use unexpected income for basic necessities, to catch up on bills, or to start a savings 
account. Richer households, however, would be more likely to view this as extra disposable 
income, making it more likely to be donated to charity. As Table 3.4 shows, however, the 
results are mostly insignificant even when dividing by wealth quartiles. Being in the bottom 
quartile substantially reduces a household’s likelihood of donating to a secular cause (and 
as a result, also in aggregate), but all other estimates are inconclusive.  
One final area of interest is the religious status of households. Similar to the concern 
described above, the aggregate result may mask interesting differences between religious 
and nonreligious households. Table 3.5 contains the results of a fixed effects model that 
divides households by religious status. As with categories of wealth, this separation leads 
to no significant results for either of the subcategories. 
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Table 3.1: Basic Fixed Effects Model  
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Table 3.2: Fixed Effects Model (Extensive Margin Only) 
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Table 3.3: Fixed Effects Model with Last Period Inheritances  
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Table 3.4: Fixed Effects Model Divided by Wealth Category  
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Experimental results consistently support the hypothesis that individuals are more 
willing to consume unearned money than earned money. This “house money effect” was 
identified empirically in Panel Study of Income Dynamics data by Steinberg et al. (2002). 
However, this analysis was limited to cross sectional methods, as only one year of the 
necessary data was available at the time. In this paper I ask whether this empirical 
correlation is indicative of an actual relationship between inheritances and giving, or if it 
is largely driven by heterogeneity between individuals that would be unobservable in a 
cross sectional model. To do this I take advantage of subsequent waves of PSID data to 
construct a panel and extend the prior analysis. I find that when individual effects are added 
into the regressions, the previously observed correlation is sharply reduced. Inheritances 
rarely have a significant positive effect, and almost never are significantly different than 
earned money, transfers, or wealth. While some positive results remain, my modified 
analysis nevertheless shows that much of the previous result was due to the cross sectional 
nature of the models used. When fixed effects are controlled, inheritances matter much 
less.  
This result contrasts with experimental literature, economic theory, and with basic 
intuition. A house money effect makes sense in theory, and when confronted with abstract 
situations in the laboratory, individuals generally behave in accordance with it. This does 
not, however, seem to translate into consistent analogues outside the laboratory. Either 
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individuals do in fact behave differently, or the problem is simply that empirical models 
have yet to achieve the precision necessary to identify the effect. Either way, despite 
intuition, theory, and experimental results, the empirical evidence for a house money effect 
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APPENDIX A – ALTERNATE SPECIFICATIONS AND MODELS
To test the robustness of my result, I also estimate several alternate models and 
specifications. In each case, the alternative confirms my main result.  
My first variation annuitizes inheritance sums and aggregate wealth. In Steinberg 
et al. (2002), all such stocks were annuitized to facilitate comparison with flows of income. 
The differing structure of my analysis makes this procedure less important, but I estimate 
it nonetheless. As in Steinberg et al. (2002), I annuitize at 2%, and I include the same set 
of controls and interactions that were specified in the main analysis. As demonstrated in 
Table A.1, the results are substantially the same. 
I also estimate a linear probability model and a logit model with fixed effects. The 
linear probability model yields no significant results, consistent with the main analysis. 
The logit model, however, finds that both inheritances and earned income substantially 
increase religious giving, but not secular or total giving. Despite this difference, the logit 
model is consistent with my hypothesis that controlling for individual effects will reduce 
the estimated impact of inheritances. I do find a positive result in this case, but it is 
nevertheless much smaller than that observed in cross sectional regressions. 
My data set contains a large number of observations with no inheritances, so it is 
helpful to run an auxiliary regression estimating the impact of inheritances only among 
those who inherit at some point during my panel. The result of this regression is described 
in Table A.4: inheritances and earned income significantly increase religious giving, but 
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not secular or total giving. As with previous results, however, this result remains far less 
significant than those observed in cross sections. 
Finally, I estimate two models specifically for comparison with Steinberg et al. 
(2002). First, I replicate the cross sectional analysis used in this paper. Since I use 2003-
2007 data and Steinberg et al. (2002) used 2001 data, I need to ensure that the differing 
results are due to my altered methodology and not a difference between the years used. 
Table A.5 shows that 2003-2007 data yields the same significant results as those found in 
the 2001 analysis. Second, I estimate my basic fixed effects model with stocks annuitized 
at 2%. This procedure is helpful in cross sectional models, but less necessary in my panel 
analysis. I include this model in Table A.6 to demonstrate that such annuitization would 
not substantially change my results.  
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Table A.3: Fixed Effects Logit Model 
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Table A.6: Fixed Effects Model with Wealth*Year Interactions 
 
